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1013 
DETAINEES IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 
ABOARD GUANTANAMO BAY 
Chad Lennon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the United States 
(“U.S.”) government took actions to prepare for a military response 
against those responsible for the attacks.  The Authorization for Use 
of Military Force (“AUMF”) by Congress authorized President Bush 
to take military action in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the Tali-
ban.  In a military action, when the armed forces come across mem-
bers of the opposing force, they will detain them.  The U.S. govern-
ment authorized the detention and trial, or non-trial, of individuals in 
the Global War on Terrorism.  Initially, the U.S. forces detained indi-
viduals in Afghanistan; however, they eventually moved the detain-
ees to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (“Guantanamo”). 
When an armed force detains an individual, that individual 
may, or may not, have certain rights.  A detainee may be classified as 
a combatant or non-combatant, which will have implications in the 
way he is treated.  Further, a detainee may fall under the treatment 
prescribed under the Geneva Conventions.  The Geneva Conventions 
is an effort to establish a standard for treatment of persons captured 
during a conflict.  Most of these individuals fall under the category or 
protection that the Geneva Convention provides.  However, the U.S. 
government took a different approach with those detainees associated 
with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban because the Global War on Terrorism 
was not against a recognized government or military force of another 
country. 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2015, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.A. Sociology 
2003, Wagner College; M.A. Education 2005, Adelphi University.  I would like to thank my 
parents for their continued support.  I would also like to express my appreciation to Dean 
Ken Rosenblum for his valuable suggestions and support throughout my law school career.  
Finally, I would like to thank the Touro Law Review staff, especially Alyssa Wanser, for as-
sisting me and providing helpful critiques throughout the writing process. 
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The U.S. government eventually discovered that some of its 
own citizens had taken up arms against the U.S.  The court system 
took different approaches to each detainee, based on whether he was 
a U.S. citizen captured in a foreign country or a citizen attempting a 
terrorist act within the borders of the U.S.  Moreover, reports of 
abuse against Guantanamo detainees, as well as detainees in other lo-
cations, became prevalent in the mainstream media with detainees re-
porting widespread mental and physical abuse.  The U.S. government 
first charged and convicted one of its own citizens for abusing a de-
tainee in 2004.  An increase in the reports of abuse and the media at-
tention caused the U.S. government to take action starting with the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, followed by the Military Commis-
sion Act of 2006, and the Military Commission Act of 2009.  The 
Supreme Court has also stepped into the controversy with a number 
of rulings that changed the government’s approach to the treatment of 
detainees. 
One proposal to solve the issue of the treatment of detainees 
is to establish a National Security Court.  Congress, however, has op-
posed this view; yet the District Court for the District of Columbia 
has become a court with similar characteristics of the proposed Na-
tional Security Court.  Alternatively, President Barack Obama has  
discussed shutting down Guantanamo.  The President has recently re-
leased or traded some of the detainees at Guantanamo, which may re-
flect the possibility of shutting down the facility.  Further, questions 
will arise with the President’s recent comments about opening diplo-
matic relations with Cuba. 
This Comment will discuss the U.S.’s response to the attacks 
on September 11, 2001.  Section II will examine the controversial 
history of how the U.S. gained control of Guantanamo and previously 
used it to house individuals with an undetermined legal status.  Sec-
tion II will also discuss the Geneva Convention and its applicability 
to different categories of individuals and groups.  Section III will 
consider how the U.S. government has categorized the legal status of 
Al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees.  Section IV will analyze the differ-
ences between combatants and non-combatants, and the privileges 
that may or may not apply to them.  Section V will provide examples 
of U.S. citizens charged with aiding in terrorism and discuss the legal 
rights afforded to them as U.S. citizens.  Section VI will explore the 
changes in the public’s view of detainees with the widespread reports 
of abuse against prisoners in the Global War on Terrorism.  Section 
2
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VII will examine the government’s response to prevent further abuse 
of detainees.  Finally, Section VIII will consider possible resolutions 
to bring closure to the issue of detainees, specifically those held at 
Guantanamo. 
II. HISTORY 
A. How the U.S. Government Gained Control of 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
The U.S. gained control over Guantanamo Bay following the 
Spanish-American War of 1898.1  The Platt Amendment of 1901 re-
quired Cuba to lease or sell land for use as an American military 
base.2  In 1903, a lease was agreed upon that gave the U.S. authority 
over Guantanamo Bay and ceded sovereignty to the remainder of the 
island to Cuba.3  This lease stayed in place until 1934, when the U.S. 
and Cuba agreed that the lease would remain in effect as long as the 
U.S. did not withdraw from the base.4 
The U.S. government had initially utilized Guantanamo to 
hold individuals without a determined legal status.  The first case in 
which the government’s use of Guantanamo gained national attention 
came in 1993, after the 1991 coup of the Haitian government, when 
numerous Haitians fled the country, many pursuing resettlement in 
the U.S.5  The interdiction-at-sea policy forced the return of Haitians 
caught at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard.6  Guantanamo, which the U.S. 
claimed was not subject to American laws, was used to house the ref-
ugees; however, it was ruled Guantanamo was subject to U.S. legal 
jurisdiction at that time.7  In 1993, the case was brought to the East-
ern District of New York, which ruled that the U.S. government erred 
in holding Haitian refugees in Guantanamo without the benefit of 
counsel and the Attorney General abused her discretion by denying 
 
1 Scott Packard, How Guantanamo Bay Became the Place the U.S. Keeps Detainees, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2013, 8:05 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/ 
how-guantanamo-bay-became-the-place-the-us-keeps-detainees/279308/. 
2 Guantanamo Naval Station—Proof of Title, 25 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 160 (U.S.A.G.), 
1904 WL 530. 
3 Packard, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
6 Id. at 1033. 
7 Id. at 1041. 
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detainees parole.8  This marked the beginning of the controversy re-
garding the rights of detainees held on Guantanamo. 
In November 2001, following the attacks of September 11, 
2001, the U.S. military captured a number of enemy combatants, to 
the extent where the government had to find somewhere to detain 
them.9  Some of the individuals were originally held at a base in 
Khandahar, Afghanistan.10  Each detainee was evaluated to determine 
his value for intelligence gathering to combat future terrorist opera-
tions.11  However, the staff at Khandahar was not capable of effec-
tively gathering the intelligence from each individual held.12  “Some 
of the critical conditions necessary for the establishment of a deten-
tion facility were security and safety of the detainees, control, a cer-
tain freedom from legal review, timeliness, security, established sup-
porting infrastructure, and cost managements.”13  Guantanamo was 
an ideal location because of the legal status, or lack thereof, that the 
prisoners had when being detained on non-U.S. soil.14  The detainees 
would not be afforded the right to legal representation and the rights 
of the U.S. legal system.15  Therefore, the Bush Administration con-
sidered this an ideal location for the long-term strategic view of de-
tention. 16 
The Constitution of the United States and the Bill of Rights 
are applicable to U.S. citizens inside and outside of the borders of the 
country.17  However, the Constitution and Bill of Rights become 
blurred when applied to non-U.S. citizens on land being leased in a 
foreign country.18  In Boumediene v. Bush,19 the Supreme Court held 
 
8 Id. at 1049. 





14 Packard, supra note 1. 
15 Id.; see also Brandt Goldstein, Guantanamo: The Prequel, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2007, 
1:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119672508133812403.  Judge Sterling Johnson 
Jr. declared Haitian refugees would be afforded legal representation detained at Guantana-
mo.  Id.  However, the Clinton administration negotiated an agreement that vacated Judge 
Johnson’s decision.  Id. 
16 Packard, supra note 1. 
17 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
18 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (holding that a non-U.S. citizen has ha-
beas rights on land the U.S. has sovereign jurisdiction over). 
19 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
4
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that the detainees in Guantanamo had certain rights under the United 
States Constitution, including the right to challenge their detention 
through habeas corpus.20  The groundbreaking ruling marked the first 
time the Supreme Court had held that constitutional rights were ap-
plicable to foreigners in a foreign country.21  Furthermore, this ruling 
also had the same effect that the Military Commission Act of 200622 
with regard to halting habeas corpus.23  After this ruling, the only sit-
uations in which the suspending of habeas corpus would be constitu-
tional are in cases of rebellion or invasion.24 
Since the U.S. took control of Guantanamo Bay after the 
Spanish-American War, it has been a highly controversial location to 
hold detainees.  President Obama recently stated that the U.S. would 
be looking to open diplomatic relations with Cuba.25  It is highly 
probable that Guantanamo will remain controversial, especially with 
Cuba likely seeking to regain control of the land. 
B. The Geneva Conventions 
The Geneva Conventions are rules that are applicable during 
armed conflicts and protect individuals who are not fighting, as well 
as those no longer fighting.  The individuals may be sick, wounded, 
ship wrecked, prisoners of war, or civilians.26  Thus far, there have 
been four conventions to cover the above individuals.  The first con-
vention concerned the treatment of sick and wounded members of an 
armed force; the second was for the treatment of ship-wrecked per-
sonnel; the third was for the treatment of Prisoners of War 
(“POWs”); and the fourth was for the treatment of civilians.27  Fur-
 
20 Id. at 728.  A writ of habeas corpus is brought before the court to challenge the legality 
of a person’s imprisonment or detention.  The writ may also be used to obtain a judicial re-
view of the jurisdiction of a court which has handed down a criminal sentence.  See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “habeas corpus”). 
21 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751. 
22 See infra Section VII.B. 
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
24 See generally id. 
25 Larisa Epatko, Obama’s Plan to Open Relations with Cuba in 13 Points, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Dec. 17, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/obama-
announcement-on-cuba/. 
26 See generally Geneva Convention [I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31. 
27 See generally Geneva Convention [I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
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thermore, there have been three protocols that have provided further 
amendments to the treatment of individuals during an armed conflict.  
In 1977, the first and second Protocols were extended to protect indi-
viduals in international and non-international conflicts respectively.28  
The third protocol added the adoption of the additional distinctive 
emblem, the Red Crystal, to the Red Cross, Red Crescent, and other 
emblems.29 
The Geneva Convention established and continues to govern 
the treatment afforded to Prisoners of War.  Article 4 defines a POW 
as an individual who is a member of an armed force, or an organiza-
tion resembling a military force with similar command structure with 
a distinctive sign of military activity.30  Article 118 states that an in-
dividual will be repatriated to his country at the end of hostile activi-
ties.31  Therefore, the U.S. government, according to the Geneva 
Conventions, was obligated to return Taliban and Al-Qaeda detainees 
at the conclusion of hostile activities. 
The Bush Administration faced a difficult decision regarding 
the applicability of the Conventions with this new enemy, Al-Qaeda.  
Although the Taliban was the governing force in Afghanistan, Al-
Qaeda was an organization and not a ruling political party.  The Bush 
Administration stated that members of the Taliban would not meet 
the criteria of POWs and they should be detained, as would be any 
other member of Al-Qaeda.32  The Taliban and Al-Qaeda detainees 
 
31; Geneva Convention [II] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85; Geneva Convention [III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
28 See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609. 
29 See generally Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 558 
(2005). 
30 John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary 
Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Laws, 105 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 201, 214 (2011). 
31 Id. at 234 
32 Brief for Petitioner, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 
871163, at *1 (stating the President has the right to declare an individual is an associate of 
Al-Qaeda, may be declared an enemy combatant, detained, and thus, subject to detention).  
See infra Section III.B. 
6
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were then labeled as enemy combatants at Guantanamo.33  In Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld,34 the Court held that the U.S. could not only detain those 
individuals involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks, but also any-
one who militarily opposes the U.S.35  Furthermore, the Court stated 
that habeas corpus is unavailable if an enemy is captured and de-
tained “beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United 
States.”36  Guantanamo was considered beyond the jurisdiction of the 
U.S. court system which facilitated the denial of POW status to those 
detainees.37 
The Geneva Convention governing non-international armed 
conflict is silent regarding review procedures as to who may be eligi-
ble for detention.38  Article 5, however, does state that when a detain-
ee’s status is in question, he should be afforded the status of a 
POW.39  The detainee’s status should then be determined through a 
competent tribunal.40  However, the tribunal is to determine merely 
the status of the detainee, not whether he is guilty of a belligerent 
act.41 
The Fourth Geneva Convention provides certain protections 
to detained protected persons, such as the right to be provided with an 
initial review by the state, the right to an appeal, and the right to re-
ceive a bi-annual review.42  However, the U.S. did not recognize 
members of the Taliban or Al-Qaeda as protected individuals and, 
thus, they were not provided these rights.43  Moreover, the U.S. gov-
ernment never recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan.44  
Therefore, the government’s view was that the detainees did not fall 
 
33 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at *13  (stating the Bush Administration's opinion 
that “[t]he capture and detention of enemy combatants is an inherent part of waging war, and 
the President's decision whether to detain a person as an enemy combatant is a basic exercise 
of his discretion to determine the level of force needed to prosecute the conflict”). 
34 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
35 Id. at 518. 
36 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950). 
37 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57, 834 (proposed Nov. 13, 2001) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 10). 
38 Bellinger, supra note 30, at 222. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 222-23. 
41 Id. at 223. 
42 Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
43 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  See also generally Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507. 
44 Zachary Laub, The Taliban in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 4, 
2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551. 
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under the protections of the Geneva Convention. 
The U.S. government’s view that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
do not fall under the protection of the Geneva Convention has validi-
ty.  However, there are two points that the U.S. government should 
have considered when making this decision.  First, the government 
should have considered the effect this view would have on U.S. 
troops when captured by an enemy force.  When the enemy learns of 
the policy its fighters are subject to, our enemy may want to subject 
our U.S. servicemen to similar conditions. 
The second point to consider is the example we set for the rest 
of the world.  The U.S. is one of, if not the most, influential countries 
in the world.  The U.S. compromises her standing in the international 
community when she does not afford potential POWs the protections 
of the Geneva Convention.  When the U.S. government was making 
these policy decisions, perhaps a more rigid stance should have been 
taken. 
C. 9/11 Attacks and Detainees 
On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, four hijacked commercial 
airliners were used to attack targets on U.S. soil.45  Planes flew into 
the north tower of the World Trade Center, the south tower of the 
World Trade Center, and the Pentagon; another plane, believed to be 
headed for a target in Washington D.C., was forced down by passen-
gers and crashed into the woods of Pennsylvania.46  Nineteen men hi-
jacked the four American commercial flights.47  These attacks were 
attributed to Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama Bin Laden.  Bin Laden 
was then living in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban.48 
The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief 
of the United States military, and Congress stipulates the actions he 
may take.49  On September 18, 2001, Congress authorized the use of 
military force against those groups, individuals, and states involved 
in the September 11 attacks in an effort to prevent further acts of ter-
 
45 In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Laub supra note 44. 
49 David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 745 
(2008) (stating the President may use war powers to quickly defend the United States). 
8
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rorism.50  President George W. Bush issued the military order of De-
tention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism on November 13, 2001.51  The military order au-
thorized the Secretary of Defense to detain individuals who the ad-
ministration believed to be members of Al-Qaeda, or any individuals 
involved in terrorism or terrorist activities against the U.S.52  The 
U.S. led the military action into Afghanistan, initially seizing control 
of Bagram airfield, which would become the site for detaining enemy 
forces.53  Eventually, the United States government decided to move 
hundreds of detainees from Bagram, to U.S. Naval vessels and later 
to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo.54  The first wave of detainees 
arrived in early January 2002.55 
III. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S VIEW OF AL-QAEDA AND THE 
TALIBAN 
The U.S. government had to decide on how to properly handle 
prisoners captured in Afghanistan.  The issue was whether Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban would be classified as POWs, criminals, or in another 
category.  Defining the legal status of Al-Qaeda and Taliban mem-
bers would allow a decisive action on the treatment of the prisoners 
and would then determine if certain rights would be applicable to 
them. 
A. The Legal Status of Al-Qaeda Detainees 
In his January 2002 memo to the President, White House 
counsel Alberto Gonzales endorsed not applying the Geneva Conven-
tions to Guantanamo detainees to avoid Geneva’s limitations on 
questioning enemy prisoners.56  A January 2002 legal opinion stated 
 
50 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
51 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
66 Fed. Reg. at 57, 834. 
52 Id. 
53 Michael Gordon, Securing Base, U.S. Makes Its Brawn Blend In, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 
2001), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/03/international/asia/03BASE.html. 
54 Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability after Visiting Camp X-Ray, U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEFENSE (Jan. 27, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid 
=2348. 
55 DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 
(Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031. 
56 See generally Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales and William J. Haynes II on the Ap-
9
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Al-Qaeda militants were not covered under the Geneva Convention 
for three reasons.57  First, Al-Qaeda was not a state and not entitled to 
receive the benefits of a party that is a signatory to the Geneva Con-
vention.58  Second, Al-Qaeda failed to meet the POW standards es-
tablished in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention.59  Third, Article 3 of 
the Geneva Convention did not apply to the fight between the U.S. 
and Al-Qaeda.60  Thus, the Office of Legal Counsel for the Depart-
ment of Justice (“OLC”) determined that, as a matter of law, Al-
Qaeda detainees were not considered POWs.61  Further, it was deter-
mined that Article 5 tribunals were not necessary because Al-Qaeda, 
as a group, did not qualify and, therefore, individual members of Al-
Qaeda would not qualify either.62  Al-Qaeda members would not be 
afforded the protections under the Geneva Conventions, nor classi-
fied as criminals; however, they would become detainees who lacked 
minimal, if any, legal rights. 
B. The Legal Status of Taliban Detainees 
The issue of whether the Third Geneva Convention would ap-
ply to the Taliban was a difficult one for the Bush Administration.  
President Bush determined that members of the Taliban were not 
privileged as POWs under the Third Geneva Convention.63  The Tali-
ban did not satisfy Articles 4(A)(1)-(3), despite the fact that the Tali-
ban was the controlling party in Afghanistan.64  One reason was that 
the President would be able to suspend the Third Geneva Convention 
regarding the Taliban, and therefore, the convention would be inap-
plicable to the conflict.65 
The theory that the President could determine that Taliban 
 
plication of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan 22, 2002), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-laws-taliban-detai 
nees.pdf. 
57 Major Dana M. Hollywood, Redemption Deferred: Military Commissions in the War on 
Terror and the Charge of Providing Material Support for Terrorism, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 1, 44 (2013). 
58 Id. at 44-45. 
59 Id. at 45. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Hollywood, supra note 57, at 48. 
63 See supra note 56, at 29. 
64 Id. at 30. 
65 Id. at 31. 
10
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members would not be classified as POWs under Article 4, even if 
the Third Geneva Convention was applicable, was also used to deny 
rights to Taliban members.66  This theory arose from a second legal 
opinion prepared by the OLC describing the Taliban, which discussed 
whether the Third Geneva Convention would apply to the organiza-
tion.67  The OLC opinion stated that the President had enough facts to 
declare that members of the Taliban had no legal claim to be classi-
fied as POWs under Article 4.68  The Taliban did not satisfy three of 
the four elements under Article 4(A)(2), as its members did not open-
ly comply with the Law of War.69  Further, the opinion reasoned that 
there was no need to set up Article 5 tribunals for individuals of the 
Taliban.70  The President established that the Taliban as a whole did 
not qualify, thus denying any indecision concerning individual de-
tainees and their status.71  Moreover, President Bush reasoned that the 
Taliban would not meet the criteria of POWs as a matter of law.72  
Similar to Al-Qaeda members, the Taliban would also be denied the 
status of POWs.  In fact, members of Al-Qaeda would become de-
tainees just as the Taliban. 
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF COMBATANTS AND NON-COMBATANTS 
The President is given the authority to detain individuals with 
“necessary and appropriate force”73 because it is a fundamental and 
accepted incident of war.74  The Supreme Court in Hamdi stated that 
“[t]here can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the 
United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization 
known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible 
for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing 
 
66 Id. at 30. 
67 Hollywood, supra note 57, at 47. 
68 Id. at 48. 
69 They did not wear a fixed sign, did not carry arms openly, and did not conduct their ac-
tivities in compliance with the Law of War. 
70 Hollywood, supra note 57, at 52. 
71 Id. at 50. 
72 Id. at 45. 
73 The necessary and appropriate use of force is the required force used to accomplish a 
mission.  Generally, the U.S. military may target equipment, facilities, and forces that would 
incapacitate a force tasked by a commander.  A particular mission, such as Operation Endur-
ing Freedom, would have specific rules which limit the amount of force a commander may 
use. 
74 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. 
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the AUMF.”75  The Court concluded that detention of those in this 
category during a conflict in which they are captured is a “fundamen-
tal” aspect of war.76  The Court held the detention of enemy forces is 
therefore a “necessary and appropriate force” authorized by Congress 
for the President.77  The international agreement at the Hague Con-
vention states that capturing and detaining lawful combatants, as well 
as the capture, detention, and trying of unlawful combatants, is a fre-
quent occurrence during war.78  The purpose of detention is to pre-
vent enemy forces from returning to battle and continuing their fight 
against U.S. forces.79  “The object of capture is to prevent the cap-
tured individual from serving the enemy.  He is disarmed and from 
then on he must be removed as completely as practicable from the 
front, treated humanely and in time exchanged, repatriated or other-
wise released.”80 
An individual captured during wartime can be a privileged 
combatant (also known as a Prisoner of War), an unprivileged com-
batant (a POW who violates a Law of War), or a civilian (also known 
as a noncombatant).81  The Law of War82 differentiates between com-
batants and civilians by classifying them either as the armed forces or 
the nonviolent population, and each class is afforded specific rights.  
The main point to be noted is that an individual cannot belong to both 
classes at one time.83 
The first group an individual may find himself a part of is the 
nonviolent population, or civilian populace.  A civilian is defined as 
an individual who does not aid or participate in attacking individuals 





78 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1942). 
79 Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner–of–War Status, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 571, 572 
(2002) (explaining that an individual captured is not held for punishment, but rather held to 
prevent him from continuing combat operations). 
80 In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946). 
81 10 U.S.C. § 948(a) (2009). 
82 Law of War is the legal system the military abides by to ensure there is not an abuse of 
civilians or prisoners of war.  The Law of War is utilized to prevent suffering and destruc-
tion, and to mitigate the negative effects of combat through a standard to be afforded to civil-
ians and combatants, including loss of property.  MAJOR KEITH PULS, LAW OF WAR 
HANDBOOK 2-4 (Dep’t of the Army, 2005). 
83 Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War against Al-Qaeda, 47 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 21 (2011). 
84 Id. at 8. 
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not a lawful combatant is instead a civilian.85  “In case of doubt 
whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a 
civilian.”86  A noncombatant can be temporarily detained in an ad-
ministrative detention but should not be arrested, nor subjected to 
prolonged incarceration.87 
Alternatively, an individual not considered part of the nonvio-
lent populace will be part of the armed forces group and placed in the 
privileged or non-privileged category based on his actions.  An indi-
vidual who takes up arms in a war may find himself classified as an 
enemy combatant.  An enemy combatant is an individual alleged to 
take part in aiding forces that are hostile towards the U.S., or their 
coalition partners, in Afghanistan and those who engage in armed 
conflict against the U.S. around the world.88  The term “enemy com-
batant” was first used during the Bush administration in March 
2002.89  The term was used to describe those enemies of the U.S. fol-
lowing the attacks of September 11, 2001 who did not wear tradition-
al military uniforms.90  “Enemy combatants” also included individu-
als the administration believed to be criminals.91  The strategic view 
of the term was used in an effort to justify the actions taken against 
individuals who were determined to be a direct threat to U.S. Nation-
al Security.92 
A privileged combatant can be detained, but must be released 
after hostilities cease and cannot be tried.93  A member of an armed 
force is initially considered a privileged combatant, which is an indi-
vidual who has engaged in combat, and may be classified as a 
POW.94  However, if that combatant violates a Law of War, he may 
 
85 Id. at 15. 
86 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 
(defining a civilian and the civilian populace). 
87 Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative De-
tention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375, 
382-83 (2005). 
88 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516. 
89 Chang, supra note 83, at 6. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 7. 
93 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 1983), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/30/world/geneva-convention-on-prisoners-of-war.html. 
94 A Prisoner of War is a person who belongs to an armed force who has become captured 
by his or her opposing force.  DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 25 (1956). 
13
Lennon: Detainees in the Global War on Terrorism
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
1026 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
lose the privileged status and be tried for his actions.95  Moreover, a 
combatant who hides among civilians can lose the privileged status; a 
civilian can also become a combatant, and a combatant can become a 
noncombatant.96 
The Law of War is designed to guide the members of an 
armed force in differentiating the civilian populace and the enemy 
force.  Enemy forces have legal protections similar to their opposing 
force.  For example, an armed force is able to engage in warlike ac-
tivities while still receiving legal protections from the enemy’s do-
mestic laws.97  A member of the military, whether friendly or enemy, 
may kill opposing forces without being tried for murder, capture op-
posing forces without being charged with kidnapping, and destroy the 
opposing force’s property without being liable for a tort.98  Further, 
an enemy combatant is eligible for a number of other privileges while 
detained.99 
An individual in the military may be captured and is entitled 
to certain privileges.  However, those privileges are retained only if 
specific conditions are met.  An individual must wear a uniform, or 
other item, to separate himself from the civilian populace.  One must 
also identify himself as an armed forces member and must not attack 
specific civilian objects or peaceful citizens.100 
An individual captured can separate himself by wearing a uni-
form and identifying himself as a member of an armed force.  He will 
then, generally, be classified as a privileged combatant who cannot 
face trial for his actions taken during combat.  However, the captured 
individual must conduct himself in a particular manner so as to not 
lose his privileged status.  For example, if the individual purposely 
kills a guard while being detained, he will lose his privileged status 
and likely be charged with homicide. 
As noted, an individual captured during a conflict can be clas-
sified as a combatant and will then be entitled to certain privileges, 
though he may lose those privileges for actions he may take.  There is 
no doubt that those individuals captured fighting U.S. military forces 
 
95 Robert Bejesky, Closing Gitmo Due to the Epiphany Approach to Habeas Corpus dur-
ing the Military Commission Circus, 50 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 43, 71 (2013). 
96 Id. 
97 Chang, supra note 83, at 7. 
98 Id. at 7-8. 
99 Id. at 8. 
100 Id. at 9. 
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are combatants.  However, difficulty arises because the Taliban and 
Al-Qaeda do not wear military uniforms and cannot be differentiated 
from the civilian populace.  The Law of War is a guide for members 
of an armed force to distinguish who belongs in each category and 
the rights afforded to those categories.  When an enemy force does 
not distinguish itself from the civilian populace, the issue can be a 
hotly debated topic as to which category the enemy belongs.  To 
prove to our enemies that the U.S. fights for justice, U.S. leadership 
should immediately express that we will afford our enemies the initial 
status as a POW.  There are still members of Al-Qaeda and the Tali-
ban held at Guantanamo who have yet to receive POW status.  It is 
without controversy that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have committed 
great atrocities against the U.S. and the people of this country.  The 
U.S. can distinguish herself from her enemies because she is in a 
unique position to set an example with regard to the treatment of in-
dividuals—even when those individuals are actively and aggressively 
trying to cause harm to the U.S.  Labeling the Guantanamo detainees 
as POWs will help the U.S. gain international credibility in her ef-
forts to combat terrorism. 
V. STATUS OF U.S. CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS 
U.S. forces have also encountered a number of American citi-
zens fighting American forces, such as John Walker Lindh, Jose Pa-
dilla, and Yaser Hamdi.  These individuals, after their citizenship was 
discovered, were brought to the U.S. and put on trial through the fed-
eral court system.  These three cases demonstrate the legal differ-
ences between a U.S. citizen’s treatment and that of a non-U.S. citi-
zen.  The Bush Administration wanted those U.S. citizens found 
fighting U.S. forces in the Global War on Terrorism to be detained at 
Guantanamo with the other foreigners already being detained there.  
However, the federal courts had a different view on the status of U.S. 
citizens captured in the Global War on Terrorism. 
In November 2001, U.S. forces in Afghanistan captured John 
Walker Lindh during combat operations.101  He was the first U.S. cit-
izen to be captured in Afghanistan supporting the Taliban.102  In the 
spring of 2001, Mr. Lindh traveled to Pakistan to attend an Al-Qaeda 
 
101 United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
102 Pentagon Discover Second American Taliban, CNN (Apr. 4, 2002, 1:29 PM), http:// 
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0204/04/lt.12.html. 
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military training camp.103  Once he completed his training, at his re-
quest, he joined the Taliban to fight against the Northern Alliance.104  
He was then instructed to attend another training camp, which was 
hosted by the Taliban.105  On July 15, 2002, Mr. Lindh pled guilty in 
the United States District Court of Virginia of assisting the Taliban, 
which is a felony.106  Mr. Lindh was not sent to Guantanamo at this 
time because the detainees were still being held in Afghanistan.  
However, the case may have been a precedent for future cases regard-
ing U.S. citizens and the Global War on Terrorism because, follow-
ing his guilty plea, Mr. Lindh was not sent to Guantanamo but to a 
U.S. federal prison. 
Jose Padilla is an American citizen who was arrested at Chi-
cago O’Hare Airport in May 2002.107  He was accused of planning to 
detonate a dirty bomb, leading him to be initially labeled an “enemy 
combatant.”108  The government originally held him as a military de-
tainee.109  Yet, the government eventually turned him over to the De-
partment of Justice after the Bush Administration was required to of-
fer proof about his enemy combatant status.110  Mr. Padilla was 
convicted in the federal court system on criminal charges of attending 
a terrorist training camp run by Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.111  The 
Second Circuit held that Mr. Padilla was not an enemy combatant be-
cause the President lacked authority to detain Mr. Padilla militarily. 
A question which the Supreme Court did not reach.112  This was the 
second case involving a U.S. citizen who faced the federal court sys-
tem and was not held in Guantanamo as a detainee but instead was 
incarcerated in the U.S. prison system. 
Yaser Hamdi was initially captured by the Northern Alliance 
in Afghanistan.113  The Northern Alliance released Mr. Hamdi to U.S. 
forces, which then detained and interrogated him in Afghanistan.114  
 
103 Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 567. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 566. 
107 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2004). 
108 Id. at 431. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 433-34 
111 Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 2012). 
112 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 426. 
113 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507. 
114 Id. at 510. 
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Mr. Hamdi was later sent to Guantanamo in January 2002.115  In 
April 2002, officials discovered that Mr. Hamdi was an American cit-
izen, and transferred him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia.116  The 
U.S. government initially stated that he was an enemy combatant be-
cause he was captured in Afghanistan.117  Mr. Hamdi’s father filed a 
petition on behalf of his son to be released from unlawful custody.118  
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Mr. Hamdi 
would not be afforded a hearing because he was captured in a combat 
zone.119  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mr. Hamdi would 
be granted a hearing based on the Fifth Amendment.120  This third 
case again demonstrates that a U.S. citizen will be tried in the U.S. 
court system when captured, as opposed to being sent to Guantanamo 
as a detainee. 
The federal courts have held that American citizens accused 
of aiding terrorism must be afforded an opportunity in the U.S. court 
system to determine their innocence or guilt.  The courts have 
demonstrated that a U.S. citizen is not to be held at Guantanamo with 
non-U.S. citizen detainees, nor face a military commission.  Further-
more, the courts have held there is little difference for an American 
citizen, whether or not captured outside the country, regarding his 
constitutional rights when facing charges in the Global War on Ter-
rorism.  On the other hand, individuals who are not U.S. citizens, es-
pecially those captured outside the country, generally do not have the 
opportunity to have their cases heard through the court system. 
VI. ALLEGED ABUSE CHANGES PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING 
DETAINEES 
Public opinion regarding the detention of detainees captured 
during combat in the Global War on Terrorism slowly began to 
change.  Several years after the invasion of Afghanistan, reports of 




117 Id. at 510. 
118 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511. 
119 Id. at 516. 
120 Id. at 509. 
121 REED BRODY, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 30 (June 2004), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa0604.pdf. 
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ed detainees held at Guantanamo and other detention facilities.122  A 
number of deaths attributed to interrogation techniques began to 
make the news.123  Public pressure started to mount and the govern-
ment had to take some stance against the abuse of prisoners related to 
the Global War on Terrorism. 
Detainees released from U.S. custody began to speak to the 
public about the treatment they were receiving, including those held 
at Guantanamo.  Reports began to surface of detainees who were, for 
example, physically beaten, stripped naked, and photographed.124  
Two prisoners were found dead at Guantanamo in December 2002, 
apparently from blunt force trauma.125  Another detainee, Jamal 
Naseer, was found beaten to death in March 2003 at an Army fire-
base in Gardez, Afghanistan.126  The original report stated that Mr. 
Naseer’s death was from an infection.127 
David Passaro was a Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) 
contractor and former U.S. Army Special Forces soldier.128  Passaro 
conducted numerous interrogations, and he was ultimately convicted 
for the abuse and eventual death of detainee Abdul Wali in 2003.129  
This was the first time a U.S. civilian had been indicted and convict-
ed in federal court for abusing a detainee.130  Mr. Passaro’s convic-
tion led to a sentence of 100 months.131 
Mr. Passaro arrived in Afghanistan in May 2003.132  During 
that time period, U.S. commanders focused on the number of rocket 
attacks against Asadabad.133 Reportsdetermined that Abdul Wali was 
 
122 Id. at 1-2. 
123 Id. at 2. 
124 Jeannine Bell, “Behind This Mortal Bone”: The (In)Effectiveness of Torture, 83 IND. 
L.J. 339, 347-48 (2008). 
125 Tim Golden, Army Faltered in Investigating Detainee Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 
2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/22/international/asia/22abuse.html? 
pagewanted=all.  Detainees even endured interrogations that lasted hours, while being ac-
cused of being terrorists who worked with Al-Qaeda.  Id. 
126 Craig Pyes & Kevin Sack, Two Deaths Were a ‘Clue That Something’s Wrong,’ L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/la-na-torture25sep25-
story.html#page=1. 
127 Id. 
128 United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 2009). 
129 Id. at 212. 
130 Ned Parker, U.S. Restricts Movement of its Diplomats in Iraq, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 
2007), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/sep/19/world/fg-blackwater19/2. 
131 Passaro, 577 F.3d at 222. 
132 Id. at 211. 
133 Id. 
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the individual responsible for these rocket attacks.134  Mr. Wali sur-
rendered to U.S. forces in June 2003.135  The commanders detained 
him and he was restrained with leg shackles and wrist bindings, while 
wearing a hood over his head.136  Mr. Wali was placed under 24-hour 
guard.137 
Mr. Passaro was authorized to interrogate Mr. Wali by the 
CIA commander at Asadabad.138  The interrogation consisted of re-
peatedly throwing Mr. Wali to the ground, hitting him on the arms 
and legs with a heavy, foot-long flashlight, and, while wearing com-
bat boots, kicking Wali in the groin with enough force to lift him off 
the ground.139  The interrogation continued while Mr. Wali’s condi-
tion worsened over the two-day interrogation period.140  During the 
third day, Mr. Wali collapsed and died.141  The following month, Mr. 
Passaro returned to North Carolina and a year later, a federal grand 
jury indicted him on “two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon 
with intent to do bodily harm” and “two counts of assault resulting in 
serious bodily injury.”142 
Passaro was the first case that held federal courts have juris-
diction over a non-military American citizen for committing assault 
abroad while conducting military missions.  Mr. Passaro’s conviction 
put interrogators on notice that their actions may lead to a criminal 
conviction.  Although Mr. Passaro was not conducting interrogations 
at Guantanamo, it is likely that similar techniques were used on 
Guantanamo detainees.  Despite the public outcry concerning the 
abuse of prisoners and indefinite detention, Congress has not codified 
preventive detention, nor has it ended it.143  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has not delineated the parameters of the Authorized Use of 








140 Id. at 212. 
141 Passaro, 577 F.3d at 212. 
142 Id. 
143 Sophia Brill, Comment, The National Security Court We Already Have, 28 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 525, 535 (2010). 
144 Id. 
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VII. GOVERNMENT REFORM MEASURES 
The public relations nightmare the government was dealing 
with indicated that a drastic change in the treatment of detainees had 
to take place.  Allegations of prisoner abuse were not only being 
claimed at Guantanamo, but also at Abu Ghraib,145 a scandal that 
made worldwide headlines.  The government first responded with the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which detailed techniques that 
could be used to question detainees.  The Supreme Court ruling in 
Hamdan stated that the military commissions, which simply conduct 
military trials, did not follow the military justice code.  The govern-
ment responded by signing the Military Commission Act of 2006, 
which provided that Guantanamo detainees were no longer eligible 
for the U.S. court system.  Further, the Military Commission Act of 
2009 stated Guantanamo detainees could not make claim to the rights 
afforded under the Geneva Convention. 
A. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
In response to the Abu Ghraib prison controversy and other 
allegations of abuse against prisoners in the War on Terror, Congress 
enacted the Detainee Treatment of Act of 2005 (“the Detainee 
Act”).146  The Detainee Act created rules to govern interrogation 
techniques for those in Department of Defense (“DoD”) custody; im-
posed a global prohibition on cruel, inhumane, or degrading treat-
ment of persons in U.S. custody; provided legal defenses for U.S 
government personnel subject to a civil or criminal lawsuit; and set 
forth remedies for detainees to challenge their status under the Gene-
va Convention through the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and 
Administrative Review Boards.147 
On October 5, 2005, the U.S. Senate approved an amendment 
 
145 Abu Ghraib was the site for detainees during the most recent Iraq War.  Photographs of 
detainees being criminally abused by U.S. soldiers were taken at the prison location.  The 
scandal raised concerns about the interrogations that were being conducted by U.S. military 
members and civilian contractors.  Rebecca Leung, Abuse at Abu Ghraib, CBS NEWS (May 
5, 2004), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-at-abu-ghraib/. 
146 Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, Senate Supports Interrogation Limits, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 6, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/05/ 
AR2005100502062.html. 
147 Bernard Hibbitts, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, JURIST.ORG (Dec. 31, 2005, 8:58 
PM), http://jurist.org/gazette/2005/12/detainee-treatment-act-of-2005-white.php [hereinafter 
Hibbits]. 
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to the DoD appropriations bill for 2006.148  The proposed amendment 
established approved interrogations techniques for handling detainees 
in DoD custody.149  The amendment also established jurisdiction for 
any geographic location.150  The President stated he would veto the 
bill, but the bill was nevertheless passed through compromises with 
further amendments to the bill.151  Additions to the bill included a le-
gal defense for military and civilian employees, procedures for de-
tainee status review of detainees outside of the U.S., and training for 
detainee treatment for the Iraqi forces.152  The Detainee Act was 
passed by Congress under Title X of Section A of the defense appro-
priations bill and signed into law by President Bush on December 30, 
2005.153  He stated that the act would be interpreted “ ‘in a manner 
consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to super-
vise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and 
consistent with constitutional limitations on judicial power.’ ”154 
The Detainee Act required that individuals detained in DoD 
facilities, including Guantanamo, were to be treated in accordance 
with the U.S. Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.155  
The law directed that detainees should be treated without cruel, in-
humane, or degrading punishment—essentially, nothing that would 
violate the Fifth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitu-
tion.156  The Detainee Act further stated that the Secretary of Defense 
would submit to the Armed Forces Committees of Congress the pro-
cedures for a review of all detainees within 180 days.157  The Admin-
istrative Review Board ensured no statement was made through coer-
cion and performed a check on the probative value of statements 
made.158  A yearly report would include the number of detainees 





151 Eric Schmitt & Tim Golden, Lawmakers Back Use of Evidence Coerced From Detain-
ees, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/17/politics/ 
17detain.html. 
152 Id. 
153 Hibbitts, supra note 147. 
154 Alan W. Clarke, De-Cloaking Torture: Boumediene and the Military Commissions Act, 
11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 59, 105 (2009). 
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tion.159 
The report was to be unclassified, but was to contain a classi-
fied annex if needed.160  The appellate review would be conducted by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ex-
clusively.161  Appeals were limited to those individuals detained at 
Guantanamo Bay and who were subject to a Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunal.162 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,163 the Supreme Court stated a num-
ber of holdings: it found that the Detainee Treatment Act did not de-
prive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction, military commissions were 
not expressly authorized by any congressional act, military commis-
sions’ procedures violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(“UCMJ”), and military commissions did not satisfy Geneva Conven-
tion standards.164  This meant that the detainees held at Guantanamo 
would be held under the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, and as such, 
the military commissions were not following the proper UCMJ pro-
cedures.  Moreover, the military trials were not within the principles 
of the Geneva Conventions.165 
B. Military Commissions Acts 
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdan, Congress 
passed the Military Commission Act of 2006166 (“MCA of 2006”).  
The MCA of 2006 mandated that Guantanamo captives were no 
longer entitled to access the U.S. civil justice system, and thus all 
outstanding habeas corpus petitions were stayed.167  Further, the 
MCA of 2006 established a tribunal process that was intended to be 
compliant with the Geneva Conventions.168  The MCA of 2006 stipu-
lated that the military commissions would have jurisdiction “to try . . 
. any offense made punishable by this chapter . . . or the law of war, 
whether such offense was committed before, on, or after September 
 
159 Id. 
160 Hibbitts, supra note 147. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
164 See id. 
165 Id. at 626. 
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11, 2001[.]”169  The MCA of 2006 would allow the CIA to continue 
its interrogations of suspected terrorists.170  Additionally, military and 
intelligence personnel were given legal protections for any future 
lawsuits filed by those individuals they were interrogating.171  The 
MCA of 2006 also contained the procedures for the conduct of such 
interrogations.172  The MCA of 2006 was drafted to be comparable to 
the commissions enacted during the Revolutionary War, Civil War, 
and World War II.173 
On June 12, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Boumediene v. Bush174 that the MCA of 2006 could not remove the 
right of Guantanamo captives to access the U.S. federal court sys-
tem.175  All previous Guantanamo captives’ habeas petitions were eli-
gible to be reinstated.176  The judges considering the captives’ habeas 
petitions would be debating whether the evidence justified a classifi-
cation of “enemy combatant.” 
The Military Commissions Act of 2009 (“the MCA of 2009”) 
added that a non-citizen who was part of Al-Qaeda at the time of an 
offense would be subject to a military commission, otherwise known 
as a military trial.177  However, the main purpose of the MCA of 2009 
was to update provisions relevant to the Guantanamo habeas corpus 
cases.178  Moreover, the MCA of 2009 stated, “[n]o alien unprivi-
leged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission under 
this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a basis for a pri-
vate right of action.”179 
As of February 2013, the military commissions have convict-




171 The White House Office of Communications, Fact Sheet: The Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, 2006 WL 2950497, at *1 (Oct. 17, 2006). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at *2. 
174 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
175 Id. at 789. 
176 Id. at 793. 
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sions have faced is timing because of the Ex Post Facto Clause.  The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in Al-Bahlul v. 
United States181 that the court could not uphold the defendant’s con-
viction for providing material support for the September 11, 2001 at-
tacks.182  The military commission nonetheless convicted Al-Bahlul 
of the offense, but the Court of Appeals held that this would violate 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.183  Therefore, the court system cannot con-
vict an individual of a crime that was not codified at the time it was 
committed.  The MCA of 2006 and 2009 took steps to bring finality 
to the status of detainees at Guantanamo.  The U.S. government was 
attempting to keep the detainee cases out of the federal court system, 
while the federal court system was pushing back to hear all the de-
tainee cases. 
VIII. POSSIBLE FUTURE FOR THE DETAINEES 
The military tribunal that was utilized under the AUMF au-
thorized a military response against those responsible for the attacks 
on September 11, 2001.184  The AUMF was an executive order by the 
President on November 13, 2001 requiring detention and a military 
trial for noncitizens “at an appropriate location designated by the Sec-
retary of Defense outside or within the United States” when “there is 
reason to believe that such individual” is a member of Al-Qaeda or 
had “engaged in [or] aided . . . acts of international terrorism” intend-
ed to produce “injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its 
citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy.”185  The gov-
ernment faces the dilemma of what to do with the detainees now that 
combat operations have concluded in Afghanistan.  One proposal was 
for a National Security Court to decide the legal fate of the detainees.  
A second proposal was to completely shut down Guantanamo and 
move all the detainees out in a variety of ways, including sending 
 
natsec/R40932.pdf. 
181 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
182 Id. at 29. 
183 Id. at 30-31.  The Ex Post Facto Clause ensures that an individual will not be charged 
for a crime that took place before the enactment of the statute making the act illegal.  
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Sep. 18, 2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541). 
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them to prisons in other countries. 
A. A National Security Court 
President Barak Obama has advocated for Congress to end the 
indefinite detention facilities and the extra-judicial tribunal system 
that began under the Bush administration.186  A proposal by two law 
professors in 2007 sought to create a National Security Court.187  
They recommended that Congress would include an Article III judge 
on the National Security Court to determine whether there was a val-
id detention.188  Furthermore, Congress would define who is an ene-
my and establish rules pertaining to classified evidence.189  The fed-
eral courts have held it is unconstitutional to use classified evidence 
as a basis to validate the ongoing detention.190  When the evidence is 
“unclassified or disclosed, it [becomes] evident that the government’s 
‘terrorist’ claims were based on [un]provable hearsay and biased 
sources.”191  However, Congress and President Obama stated that 
they would not seek to establish this new court.192  The Department 
of Justice then stated it would continue to hold the detainees at Guan-
tanamo with the authority provided in the AUMF.193  Instead of a Na-
tional Security Court, the District of Columbia District Court has be-
come the equivalent of one. 
The D.C. Circuit has issued rulings on nearly twenty “public-
ly available” cases pertaining to the detainees at Guantanamo.194  The 
D.C. Circuit has ruled on the requirements to detain and the evidence 
 
186 Charlie Savage, Amid Hunger Strike, Obama Renews Push to Close Cuba Prison, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/us/guantanamo-
adds-medical-staff-amid-hunger-strike.html?pagewanted=all. 
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190 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 816-17. 
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tinction without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 619 (2005). 
192 Peter Baker, Obama to Use Current Law to Support Detentions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 
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193 Brill, supra note 143, at 530. 
194 Id. at 528 (discussing that the District Court for the District of Columbia has essential-
ly become the national security court since the decision to consolidate habeas corpus cases 
following Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)). 
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that may be used by the U.S. government.195  The judges who have 
decided habeas corpus appeals have approved long-term preventive 
detention, dependent on the government showing the individual has 
been “a member of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces,” by a 
preponderance of the evidence.196  Most rulings on the detention of 
individuals have referenced the Case Management Order (“CMO”) 
by Judge Thomas Hogan.197  The CMO provides rules on the gov-
ernment’s obligation to disclose evidence and provide adequately 
similar evidence to that of classified government information.198  Fur-
thermore, these rules establish parameters on the undue burden of al-
lowing hearsay evidence, and the process of evidentiary hearings.199 
A National Security Court is a suitable solution for the issue 
of housing detainees because the legal system will bring closure to 
their legal status.  Military operations include reliance on classified 
information that is likely used when capturing the detainees.  Con-
gress would establish the rules of evidence pertaining to the classified 
information, which would lessen the concerns of revealing it to the 
enemy.  However, Congress has shown reluctance in creating this 
court, and instead has allowed the D.C. Circuit to essentially take on 
that role.  Until the government considers creating a National Securi-
ty Court, the D.C. Circuit is a viable alternative.  The D.C. Circuit 
can continue to hear cases pertaining to the detainees, and the Ameri-
can legal system that our nation was based on can bring closure to 
those still detained. 
B. Shutting Down Guantanamo 
By the end of the Bush administration, the number of detain-
ees fell to 250, and at the end of Obama’s first term the number was 
down to 215.200  President Obama is apparently making efforts to shut 
down Guantanamo.  In the coming months, the Obama Administra-
tion is attempting to move the detainees, including sending 64 indi-
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198 Brill, supra note 142, at 531. 
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viduals to other countries.201  The President has communicated with 
other heads of state to bring a close to the Guantanamo issue before 
he leaves office.202  As of February 2011, Guantanamo Bay still held 
approximately 173 detainees at Camp Delta.203  The U.S. has looked 
at sending the detainees from Guantanamo to Latin America.204  One 
possibility is Uruguay that took custody of six detainees in December 
2014.205  The U.S. still has grave concerns about many of the prison-
ers, particularly those from Yemen, who pose a significant terrorist 
threat.206  The administration also has concerns with the effect of the 
recent attempt to open diplomatic relations with Cuba and the cost to 
maintain Guantanamo.207 
Shutting down Guantanamo may serve a purpose; however, 
closing the facility by releasing detainees is a decision that may cost 
American lives.  Many of the detainees are held in Guantanamo on 
very serious allegations, or because they were caught fighting U.S. 
forces abroad.  Sending the detainees to prisons in other countries 
may be beneficial, but the countries must have adequate facilities to 
hold them.  Those countries must support America’s fight to end ter-
rorism.  Releasing a detainee to a country suspected of aiding a ter-
rorist organization is the equivalent of arming a detainee and letting 
him walk out of prison to immediately engage in combat against the 
U.S. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The events of September 11, 2001 have changed the way 
Americans see the world.  Our new enemies, terrorists, specifically 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, are viewed from a different perspective.  
The Bush Administration responded by authorizing military action in 
Afghanistan and detaining non-citizens in the new Global War on 
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Terrorism.  After the influx of detainees at facilities in Afghanistan, 
the U.S. moved them to Guantanamo, a site with prior controversies 
concerning non-citizens. 
Detaining enemy forces is an inherent part of an armed con-
flict.  An individual captured can be classified in a few different cate-
gories for detention.  The Geneva Convention has been the interna-
tional agreement used by most nations for the ethical and humane 
treatment of persons captured during conflict.  The Global War on 
Terrorism brought to the forefront a new category of individuals, ter-
rorists.  These individuals do not fight on behalf of a recognized po-
litical party or government, but rather conduct operations to instill 
fear in a civilian populace. 
The U.S. government did not recognize the Taliban or Al-
Qaeda as individuals under the Geneva Conventions.  The U.S. even 
discovered that some of its own citizens were fighting against her in 
Afghanistan and at home.  Those U.S. citizens have the same rights 
as other U.S. citizens facing criminal charges in this country.  A sepa-
ration of rights between U.S. citizens and non-citizens has been es-
tablished leaving the non-citizens’ legal rights in question in Guan-
tanamo. 
The country, and the world, has heard from a number of pre-
vious detainees about the treatment they received while in U.S. cus-
tody.  There were a number of “suspicious” deaths of detainees while 
in U.S. custody.  As word of this treatment spread, the national and 
international community began to raise questions concerning the 
treatment and rights of the detainees.  As public pressure mounted, 
the U.S. had to make a change that began with charging Mr. Passaro 
with abuse of a detainee.  Congress then followed with the Detainee 
Act, the MCA of 2006, and the MCA of 2009. 
Guantanamo has been the center of controversy since the U.S. 
first gained control of the land from Cuba.  The debate on the present 
controversy dates back to the early 2000s.  President Obama has stat-
ed since his first run for the Presidency that he planned on shutting 
down Guantanamo.  The number of detainees has significantly 
dropped since he first took office.  With less than two years remain-
ing in his presidency, we can expect a significant reduction in detain-
ees.  There have been recommendations about a establishing a Na-
tional Security Court to bring finality to the status of the detainees, 
but President Obama does not see this as a viable option.  Neverthe-
less, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has become a 
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version of this proposed court. 
One thing remains certain, the country is still in the midst of 
the Global War on Terrorism and cannot stall in its decision making.  
This country cannot afford to willingly hand over terrorists in an at-
tempt to appease any other country.  However, we must still set an 
example to the world and treat these detainees as we would want our 
armed forces to be treated when detained by an opposing force—
whether that force is another country or an organization with no affil-
iation to another country. 
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